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The Struggle for Korea, 1876–1882 | Jan Kočvar
that the Japanese gradually started feeling they could defeat China. From 
this point of view, temporal victory of Chinese policy in 1882 had caused an 
enormous defeat.83
Thus, the events of the summer of 1882 were a tactical victory for 
the Chinese, who strengthened their position in Korea, and a strategic victo-
ry for Japan, which was motivated to enhance her military preparedness. 
For the Koreans it was undoubtedly a grave defeat, because both of their Asi-
an neighbours have realized weakness of Korean reform eff orts, as well as 
growing interest of their opponent. Both China and Japan have stationed 
their soldiers on Korean soil, and the growth of their rivalry forced them to 
interfere into the Korean matters much more intensively than before. Before 
July 1882 Kojong was able to direct the course of the matters, but after the 
Imo mutiny he couldn’t feel safe. The position of the Mins was shaken as 
well. Despite bloodshed among members of the clan, the Mins remained an 
important faction. But whereas prior to July 1882 they were generally re-
form-minded, since that time they owed their return to power to Chinese 
intervention, thus became allies of Chinese representatives. This caused 
deep enmity between them and fanatic reformers, which were admiring Ja-
panese progress and relied on Japan’s assistance. Without this unnecessary 
struggle, the advance of Korea might have continued even despite Sino-Japa-
nese tensions, but the clash between Korean factions gave to China and Ja-
pan the best pretext to infringe into Korean internal matters. And even wor-
se things had to come. 
83) DUUS, pp. 60–65.
Revival of British Liberal Party 
1902–1905
PETER SKOKAN
In the general election in January 1906, the British Liberal party defeated 
the Unionists distinctively. The Liberals gained 397 seats and were suppor-
ted by 29 Labour MPs and 82 Irish Nationalists. The Unionists shrunk to 
a minority of only 156, whereas they won in the previous general election as 
many as 402 seats. The considerable shift in composition of the Commons 
indicates that a signifi cant change, both in political practice of parties and 
in popular perception of politics, occurred. The shift is more evident from 
a fact that the Liberal Party was in a deep crisis since 1886 and the revival 
itself took place only in last four years after the end of the Boer War. I suppo-
se, it could be said, that the change related to two basic phenomenons. A slow 
and painful exchange of generations in the Liberal party since 1880s was 
the fi rst; the second was a slow reintegration of the Liberal Party, which was 
arising from an absence of theme that could alienated various frictions 
amongst the Liberals and from opposition to proposed solutions to domestic 
reforms of the Unionists.
Generation exchange
Since the mid-1880s, the Liberal party faced a deep crisis that was caused by 
a stubborn endeavour of its leaders to solve the Irish question at any cost. It led 
to a split in 1886, which weakened the Liberals strongly. However, it cannot be 
claimed that the party lost considerable number of popular votes, because 
Francis Schnadhorst´s activities in the National Liberal Federation prevented 
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Neohegelian Oxford philosophers T. H. Green and D. G. Ritchie, who had 
reinterpreted classical liberal principles, had refused utilitarism as the only 
aspect of social progress, and had formulated a concept of positive liberty.5 
This ideological shift opened the door for interest in lower social classes that 
demanded their broader participation on political life. By adoption of these 
new ideas, the new generation move away from positions of mid-Victorian 
Gladstonianism in ideology. In practice, they inclined to more active welfare 
policy of the state in order to appease relatively aggressive strikes and lock-
outs6 that appeared because of low living standards of the poor and sprea-
ding socialist movement. 
The generation exchange reached the top in the 1890s, when plen-
ty of Gladstonians, including Gladstone himself, retired, died or was gradu-
ally loosing considerable part of their infl uence.7 The process of the genera-
tion exchange itself was accompanied with a deep crisis, threatening by 
another split of the party, concerning imperial and foreign policy as well as 
attitudes to the concept of new liberalism. 
The crisis escalated in mid-1890s, after a retirement of Gladstone, 
when the Liberals were aff ected by an intra-party struggle over Gladstone’s suc-
cession. It was defi nitively solved as late as in February 1899, when Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannermann became the leader of the party. He fully represented 
certain “shift in progress” amongst the Liberals at the turn of the centuries. 
On the one hand, he was an old mid-Victorian, who was loyal to classical libe-
ralism and who had advanced to the highest politics systematically. On the 
other hand, he was partially open to new liberalism. When he became the 
Leader of the Liberal party in 1899 hardly anybody could have imagined 
that he would restore an order amongst the Liberals. However, his attitudes 
to the Boer War and his ability to negotiate with numerous frictions within 
the party reunited, agglutinated and prepared the Liberals for a constructi-
ve opposition against the Unionists within the years 1902–1906. 
5)  EMY, H. V., Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 6–7. 
6)  POWELL, D., The New Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, in: The Historical Journal, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (1968), pp. 369–393. Compare also PELLING, H., A History of British Trade Unionism., 
pp. 89–103.
7)  We can mention here, for instance John Brigit, who died in 1889, W. E. Gladstone himself 
died in 1898, W. V. Harcourt left active politics in 1895, John Morley was continualy loosing 
infl uence since the general election in 1895.
it.1 The loss itself was embodied, above all, in secession of some infl uential ra-
dicals under a leadership of Joseph Chamberlain. Their breakaway was di-
rectly connected with a loss of their quite provocative political potential. What 
was even worse, a majority of the Whigs joined Chamberlain and established 
the Liberal Unionists Party, which as early as in 1887 began to cooperate with 
the Conservatives directly at a Cabinet level. Moreover, the secession of the 
Whigs had a serious impact on fi nance of the Liberal Party that had to struggle 
with insuffi  cient funds until the beginning of the 20th century.2
The Whigs however held an ambivalent attitude to the Liberals. 
They were bound to them by a long tradition and did not want to destroy it 
defi nitively. Therefore, they, in a limited extent, supported some Liberal pro-
posals in the Lords within the years 1886–1893. Despite this fact, their suspi-
cious attitude towards the Liberal party’s activities in Irish question was in-
surmountable. It proved in 1893, when Gladstone introduced his second 
Home Rule Bill. This step of the Prime Minister destroyed last relics of their 
sympathy to the party and forced them to closer cooperation with the Con-
servatives defi nitively.3
Such a situation opened enough space for a young generation, 
which began to assert itself gradually. In 1880s and at the beginning of 
1890s, men appeared there on the political scene, who led the party in the 
fi rst three decades of the 20th century. Amongst them were such fi ne perso-
nalities as David Lloyd George, Herbert Henry Asquith, Augustine Birrell, 
Richard Burdon Haldane, Edward Grey, or James Bryce.4 They were strongly 
infl uenced by ideas of new liberalism, which come out from philosophy of 
1)  McGILL, B., Francis Schnadhorst and Liberal Party Organisation, in: The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol 34, No. 1 (Mar., 1962), pp. 19–39.
2)  The situation changed, whena new Liberal Chief Whip – Herbert Gladstone – defi ned rules 
for fi nnancial support for Liberal candidates and cleared up competencies of National 
Liberal Federation and Liberal Central Association. See RUSSELL, A. K., Laying the charges 
for the landslide: The Revival of Liberal Party Organisation 1902–1905, in: MORRISS, A. J. A. 
(ed.), Edwardian Radicalism 900–1914. Some Aspects of British Radicalism, London and 
Boston, 1974, pp. 62–74.
3)  PHILLIPS, G. D., The Whig Lords and Liberalism, 1886 –1893, in: The Historical Journal, Vol. 
24, No. 1 (Mar., 1981), pp. 167–173. 
4)  David Lloyd George joined the Parlianment in 1890 for Caernarvon Borough; Herbert H. 
Asqith in 1886 for East Five; Augustine Birrell in 1885 for Liverpool; Edward Grey in 1882 
for Berwick-upon-Tweed; James Bryce in 1880 for Tower Hamlets.
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vanishing together with growing diffi  culties in South Africa. Finally, British 
problems to defeat Boer commandos led to a scorched earth policy and to an 
establishment of concentration camps. The latter issue was, for a long time, 
beyond an attention of the Liberals. Only a return of Emily Hobhouse, on 
24 May 1901, to London, opened an arduous discussion over the problem.10 
Her report about conditions in camps shook up Cambell-Bannerman to such 
an extent that he denounced practice of the British in South Africa as “me-
thods of barbarism”.11 A reaction to the expression was immediate and two-
folded. On the one hand, there were those, mainly Unionists and an infl uen-
tial friction of Liberal Imperialists within the Liberal party, who supported 
the policy of the Cabinet against the Boers and refused criticism of the Libe-
ral leader. On the other hand, there were moderate Liberals and the so-called 
pro-Boers adhering principles of Little Englanderism,12 who joined Camp-
bell-Bannerman in assault on the Cabinet. Although the Liberal leader by his 
denunciation almost caused another split in the party,13 his attitude to the 
problem, playing on exhaustion of British society of the war, built out a bac-
kground for future success. The victory of the Liberals in 1906 was based, 
amongst others, on political mistakes of the Unionists regarding domestic 
policy. However, only the end of the Boer War turned a full attention of poli-
ticians and society to the inland issues. 
The fi rst question that sharply weakened a Unionist position con-
cerned education reform. It had been discussed in various forms since the 
year 1895 when, Bryce Commission on Education advised to concentrate exe-
cutive power in education system in a newly established central educational 
body.14 Simultaneously, it was clear that it was necessary to reform the whole 
10)  NERAD, Velká Británie a búrske státy. Příspěvek ke studiu politiky v jižní Africe na sklonku 
viktoriánské éry, doctoral thesis at FF UK in Prague 2004, p. 201, (manuscript).
11)  WILSON, J., A Life of Sir Henry Campbell – Bannerman, London 1973, str. 348.
12)  The concept of Little Englanderism was based upon a traditional gladstonian attitude to 
foreign aff airs that was determined by moral values strongly. An idea to extend the Em-
pire was for Little Englanders unacceptable and unmoral because of its aggressiveness 
and expenses. From this point of view, active imperialism was inconsistent with Noncon-
formist creed that had completely diff erent priorities: self-help, political reform, peace, 
temperance and religious liberty. See for example AULD, J. W., The Liberal pro-Boers, in: 
The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2. (May 1975), p. 97. 
13)  McCALLUM, R. B., The Liberal Party from Earl Grey to Asquith, London 1963, pp. 133–134.
14)  MACKAY, R. F., Balfour. Intellectual Statesman, Oxford 1985. p. 85.
Similar shift shaped up amongst the Conservatives as well in the 
mid-1880s. Randolph Churchill’s expression of “Tory democracy”8 that ac-
cented a need to focus an attention of the Tories to middle classes primarily, 
off ered a direct competition with Whigism and Liberalism and their concen-
tration on a broad political reform. Popularity of the concept proved a fact 
that, according to the general election results within years 1885–1900, the 
suburbs of cities and big towns was marked as “villa toryism.”9 However, the 
radical shift entirely connected with a generation exchange in the Conserva-
tive Party did not succeed and political mistakes of the Unionists within the 
years 1902–1905 destroyed its potential.
Moreover, the new Liberal generation was on alert because of foreign 
competition, above all German and American. It included all fi elds of social life 
in all its forms. They worried about British ability to compete other Powers, 
what was braced up by British inability to defeat the Boers quickly and decisi-
vely. Their adherence to the initiative for quest for national effi  ciency had roots 
somewhere there, which required a defi nitive shift in liberal policy, in favour 
of new liberalism, and an adaptation of its new ideas to practice. 
From this point of view, it seems that the revival of the Liberal 
party after the year 1902 is not possible to separate from the generation ex-
change from late 19th century. The new liberal generation was prepared to 
answer the new situation and to answer needs and challenges of the era by 
adoption of new approaches. This attitude met positive response at the be-
ginning of the 20th century. However, it would be misguiding to claim that 
generation exchange and adoption of new liberalism were the only or the 
most important causes of the revival. Political mistakes of the Unionists 
played an important role as well.
Opposition to Unionist reforms
After the Khaki election in autumn 1900, it seemed that the Unionists were 
at the top of power and that the Liberals could not endanger them for a very 
long time. A jingoistic wave accompanying the election gave a considerable 
advantage to the Unionists. However, a zeal rising from a quick victory was 
8) FORSTER, , R. F., Lord Randolph Churchill. A Political Life, Oxford 1981 pp. 297–298.
9)  ROBERTS, M., Villa Toryism’ and Popular Conservativism“ in Leeds, 1885–1902, in: The His-
torical Journal Vol. 49, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 217–246.
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Nonconformists were moreover outraged by a fact that they would 
pay Anglican and even Catholic schools through the rates directly.17 In addi-
tion, they refused to send their children to schools provided by state, which 
were undenominational. The latter problem was serious mainly in areas, 
where was no other alternative to schools provided by the state.18
Both objections were matters of principle. The Nonconformists, 
struggling since the 17th century against privileges of the Anglican Church, 
could not take into account granting of Anglican education by local rates. 
However, in fact, they participated on granting of the established Church 
through taxes and national budget indirectly for a long time. From this 
point of view, the Bill just modifi ed a cash fl ow, but even this change was 
unacceptable for them, because they were not disposed to fund their old 
enemies directly.
The second issue was more serious. The resistance of Nonconfor-
mists to send children to state schools rose from a fear that a religious creed 
of their off spring was endangered. Practically, it was easier to infl uence the 
school board than county council, which was immune to such activities. In 
this respect, they felt that whereas Anglican and Catholic school retained 
their identity, the Nonconformist ones loosing it.
The divided Liberal party faced the Bill surprisingly united. Only 
some Liberal Imperialists supported the measure, but the majority of Libe-
rals rejected it, because there were too many Nonconformists amongst them. 
They hoped that the Bill would be abandoned because of the opposition of 
Joseph Chamberlain, exactly like in 1896. A widespread campaign had also 
some fruits. The Education Bill had become the topic number since July 1902 
in public and by-elections in Orkneys and Shetlands showed a slight shift of 
public opinion to Liberal attitude. Moreover, some Nonconformists organi-
zed themselves in the Passive Resistance Committee, which exhorted for re-
fusing to pay rents. Although the campaign had not expected national eff ect, 
locally, above all in Wales, it had a relatively long life. For example, in 1904 
there were 7324 refusals to pay local rates.19 
17) McCALLUM, pp. 136–137.
18)  ROWLAND, P., The Last Liberal Governments: The Promised Land. 1905–1910, London 1968, 
p. 77.
19) GRIGG, J, Lloyd George. The People´s Champion, 1902 –1911, London 2002, p. 37.
system of national education, according to its fragmentation and constantly 
higher requirements for eff ective technical education.
The fi rst attempt to enforce the reform of education was undertaken 
as early as in 1896, but a strong opposition of the Liberals, whom Joseph 
Chamberlain joined, destroyed it. By 1899, owing to the recommendation of 
the Bryce Commission, it was set up the Board of Education, but its fi rst presi-
dent Duke of Devonshire had little interest in its competencies. Despite this 
fact, a work on a broad reform of British education system began as early as in 
1900. It was complicated because of an opposition of the Nonconformists 
amongst the Liberal Unionists headed by Joseph Chamberlain. They felt en-
dangered by Balfour’s intention to adopt clause 27 of the 1896 Bill, which bre-
ached the Cowper-Temple clause of 1870 Act. The Cowper-Temple rule secured 
that education provided by state schools were undenominational and that de-
nominational schools required religious instructions according to their creed. 
Although the Government off ered Nonconformists, under the clause 27, sy-
stem as was used in voluntary schools, they rejected it as unsatisfactory. Final-
ly, the clause 27 had to be abandoned and exempted from the 1902 bill.15
Owing to such a complication, it took until 24 March 1902, when 
Arthur Balfour was able to introduce the Bill to the Parliament. The Bill in-
tended to abolish school boards established in 1870 in every nonconformist 
or state school16 and proposed a unifi ed system of control through local edu-
cation authorities. It planned to set up committees working within the coun-
ty councils, county borough councils, councils of borough with a population 
higher than 10000 and councils of urban districts with more than 20000 
inhabitants. The Bill gave fi nancial security to voluntary schools in a form of 
share from collected rates in return for a partial public control. However, 
a fundamental issue was that the voluntary schools, both Anglican and Ca-
tholic, did not lose their identity, because the managers of the schools retai-
ned the right to select their own staff  through religious instructions. On the 
other hand, schools of Nonconformists and state schools were submitted to 
local education authorities what meant their loss of a relative independence 
without any compensation.
15) Ibidem, p. 91.
16)  According to the Education Act of 1870, Anglican and Catholic schools were exempted 
from the school boards system. Therefore, they were labelled as voluntary schools. At the 
turn of the centuries most children were educated at voluntary schools, mainly Anglican. 
GRIGG, J., Lloyd George. The Peoples Champion, 1902–1911, London, 2004, p. 22.
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general election and set down that the Liberals would not oppose LRC candi-
dates in 50 constituencies.24 
The agreement was secret and did not provoke bigger excitement. 
Simultaneously, it is necessary to remark that it was profi table for both si-
des. At the fi rst place, the Liberals secured for themselves a political sup-
port of a relatively sharply expanding movement that they wanted to take 
under control. In addition, they had not to care for 50 constituencies, what 
was a clear relief for funds of the party. Moreover, in case of Labour success, 
Liberals could calculate with support of Labour MPs. On the other side, the 
LRC, in these 50 constituencies, eliminated one of the key political players 
– the Liberal Party – and thus heightened its chances to press through more 
Labour candidates into the Parliament. The basic presumption was that 
Liberal voters would vote LRC candidates because of proximity of attitudes 
of the Liberal party and LRC in last political issues and because of their 
join opposition to the Unionist government. However, the agreement 
created, meanwhile, just a relatively weak alliance, but in the year 1903 it 
appeared an issue that hardened it. On the other hand, it cemented views 
within the Liberal party itself and contributed to the general election re-
sults of 1906 considerably. The issue was a controversy over the 
Chamberlain’s proposal of the Tariff  reform.
Chamberlain’s idea of imperial preference and relatively closed 
economic system had developed since the 1890s continually. First request 
for such a system came from white colonies and dominions as Canada and 
Cape Colony but were motivated only by an endeavour to strengthen the eco-
nomic position of the colonies and the Empire itself.25 Chamberlain’s propo-
sal went further. In a fi nal version, he assumed not only economic improve-
ment of the Empire but also a reinforcement of mutual ties between colonies 
and the mother country and between colonies altogether.
Moreover, the measure was to have one additional and very im-
portant side eff ect. By rising tariff s, the solution was to secure fi nancial re-
serves for extended shipbuilding programme and for welfare reforms, above 
all old age pensions that concerned Chamberlain’s mind since the 1890s. He 
introduced the proposal to the Cabinet in 1902 but he met with a hard op-
24)  BRIGGS, A., The Political Scene, in: NOWELL-SMITH, S. (ed.), Edwardian England, 1901–1914, 
London 1964, p. 65.
25)  ZEBEL, S. H., Joseph Chamberlain and the Genesis of Tariff  Reform, in: The Journal of Brit-
ish Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1. (November 1967), p. 137.
In December 1902, fi nally, the Bill became the law. Although it 
was considerably amended,20 it changed British educational system signi-
fi cantly. Simultaneously, it off ered the Liberals a background for reunion of 
the Liberal Imperialist with the rest of the Party on a basis of general oppo-
sition to the measure.
Whereas the education issue created foundations for the future 
success, the dispute over rights of trade unions helped to set up a closer co-
operation between Labour representatives and the Liberal party. The Taff  
Vale judgement21 together with cases Lyons vs. Wilkins and Quinn vs. Lea-
them22 was a real disaster for trade unions. These aff airs established a dan-
gerous precedent according to which trade unions were responsible for fi -
nancial losses of employers caused by strikes. It was a huge threat to funds of 
trade unions and it destroyed their most important and effi  cient weapon – 
strike as such. Employers had not to worry of their profi t more, because fi -
nancial losses were, since the Taff  Vale judgement, exportable. Owing to the 
treat, the membership in trade unions began to rise considerably as well. In 
1903, the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) established in February 
1900 represented as many as 850 thousands organized workers. 23 In the 
same time, the LRC was recovering from the Taff  Vale judgement, what pro-
ved in by-election in Bernard Castle, where the LRC candidate, Arthur Hen-
derson, defeated both Liberal and Unionst candidate for the fi rst time.
The Liberal party, infl uenced by ideas of new liberalism, interested 
in issues of working men as well. Its turn to welfare questions assumed an 
importance continually and the Taff  Vale judgement helped to intensify its 
concern about industrial relations. Growing potential of the LRC and an ad-
option of new liberalism by the Liberals led to a political agreement between 
Chief Whip, Herbert Gladstone, and Secretary of the LRC, Ramsey MacDo-
nald, to the so-called Lib–Lab Pact. It opened a closer cooperation for the next 
20)  The most important amendment proposed by Henry Hobhouse meant preservation of 
school board, but their competencies were strongly limited on issues concerning only 
direct material managing of the school. MACKAY, R. F., op. cit., p. 101.
21)  DAVIDSON, R., The Board of Trade and Industrial Relations, in: The Historical Journal, Vol. 
21, No. 3 (Sept., 1978), pp. 571–591. 
22)  Decision in the case Lyons vs Wilkins forbade demonstration against picketing and decision 
in the case Quinn vs. Leathem confi rmed the Taff  Vale judgement. See PELLING, p. 124.
23) Ibidem.
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War and which had been fi nally abolished by the budget for the year 1903. It 
had revived reminiscences on and rhetoric of the 1840s. 
In face of such an opposition, Liberal Imperialist, from whom 
some were sympathetic to the Chamberlain’s, were forced to defend basic 
principles of the free trade.29 From this respect, Chamberlain’s attack at the 
free trade had a unifying eff ect on the Liberal Party. Free trade was a basic 
element of ideology of the party and of the country itself as well, because “it 
has had no experience of the working of a system of protection, has never seen 
the pinch of poverty, of distress, and the lawlessness and disorder which ac-
companied it when it existed before.”30 
A Liberal opposition to the imperial preference was backed up by 
both ideological and practical reasons. An ideological level, they felt that 
such an attack on free trade was simultaneously an attack on liberal and 
Victorian faith in abilities of individuals to assert themselves in a hard 
competition. It was an attack on belief in man himself and his talents. Alt-
hough the Liberal party was shifting to the concept of New Liberalism 
slowly, it was not prepared for protectionism in economic fi eld. It develo-
ped an idea of national effi  ciency, which presumed industrial and social 
effi  ciency within the principles of free trade that could be reached only by 
widespread domestic reforms and not by conservation of current circum-
stances by adoption of protectionism.
At a practical level, the Liberal party used an argument that the 
imperial preference would mean considerable rise of prices of food. Their 
argument was based on well thought reasons. Foreign food was cheaper be-
cause of its mass production and thus because of its production costs. Now 
prices of foreign food had to hike to very high level in order to British food 
production could compete them in prices. The problem was that the dome-
stic food production was able to cover only 1/6 of the demand.31 Therefore, 
because of British non-self-suffi  ciency, the rise of prices of foreign food could 
rise above prices of food produced in Britain. Even import of a cheap Cana-
dian food could not hinder the trend, because also this import was to be 
charged by although lower but still tariff s, that would hike prices.
29)  HOWE, A., Free Trade and Liberal Englan, 1846–1946, Oxford, 1997, pp. 244–245.
30)  Speech of Henry Cambell-Bannermann at Scarborough on 16th May 1903. Quoted in WIL-
SON, p. 408.
31)  CAIN P. J. – HOPKINS, A. G., British Imperialism, 1688 –2000, London 2002 , p. 191. 
position. His main opponents appeared amongst Unionist diehard adher-
ents of the free trade, who refused any protective or preferential basis of 
Britain’s economic system. Vice versa, they demanded an abandonment of 
temporary tariff s on corn and fl our that were introduced due to expenses of 
the Cabinet on the Boer War.26
Finally, he lost a vote in the Cabinet over the question and thus he 
decided to present the measure to the public in Birmingham on 15 May 
1903. In the speech itself he did not omit to underline: “For my own part, 
I believe in a British Empire, in an Empire which, although it should be its fi rst 
duty to cultivate friendship with all the nations of the world, should yet, even 
if alone, be self-sustaining and self suffi  cient, able to maintain itself against 
the competition of all its rivals.”27 
The political situation became explosive. From Chamberlain’s im-
pulse was set up the Tariff  Reform League, but 54 his Unionist opponents 
established the Free Food League immediately.28 The crisis within the Cabinet 
reached the top in September 1903, when Chamberlain himself but also his 
three major opponents - C. T. Ritchie, Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lord Geor-
ge Hamilton – resigned. Prime Minister Balfour announced all four resignati-
ons altogether, by what he avoided an open split and came in for a reputation 
of conciliatory and far-sighted politician for some time. However, then he ap-
pointed Chamberlain’s son, Austin, Chancellor of the Exchequer, what was ge-
nerally felt as an expression of his sympathy to the proposed tariff  reform. 
Consequences were almost immediate. A key person of the Liberal Unionists 
in the Cabinet – Duke of Devonshire – resigned on the 2 October.
After the 15 May 1903, when the proposal became public, the Libe-
ral party could not stay aside. Its reaction was united as in the case of the 
Education Act in previous year. Although the tariff  reform was closely bound 
with approaches to the colonial and imperial policy upon which the party 
was divided, it off ered a perfect opportunity for defi nitive reunion of various 
fractions within the party. Certain indication for successfulness of their at-
titudes among the public was a campaign against the so-called bread tax in 
1902, which had attacked at corn tax set up because of expanses of the Boer 
26)  GRIGG, p. 58.
27)  An article in Birmingham Daily Post from the 16th May 1903 referring about 
Chamberlain´s speech. Quoted in ZEBEL, p. 148.
28)  JUDD, D., Vzestup a pád britského impéria, Praha 1999, p. 207.
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the Liberal League into the most aggressive Liberal weapon against the im-
perial preference.36
 He was sympathetic to accent of the Chamberlain’s measure to 
imperial questions, but he refused strengthening of the Empire at the cost of 
newly established protectionism. He was afraid of opening foreign hostility 
to protectionist imperial custom union.37 Therefore, he preferred another 
solution, which appeared in demands of the above-mentioned national effi  ci-
ency. The reason was simple; the national effi  ciency did not attack any old 
Victorian principle and required only certain redefi nition and adaptation 
on new circumstances. It advocated a strengthening of mutual relations bet-
ween the mother country and colonies by free trade, which should be stimu-
lated by raised national effi  ciency secured by broad industrial, educational 
and social reforms. This way should refresh the Empire, whereas controver-
sial political issues as economic protection should remain closed.
Despite Rosebery’s ambitions, his lack of action led the Liberal 
League to total isolation.38 The organisation, which had been established as 
an alternative programme to the main Liberal body originally lost its power 
and discipline. It could be observed on a fact that even its members did not 
want to wait for clear political action of their leader. However, they had not 
alternative and were relatively easily reintegrated to the main party structu-
res. The Liberal League thus stopped being a separate or semi-separate poli-
tical organisation. Its joint opposition with the Liberal party to Unionist 
measures and passivity of Lord Rosebery caused the wished conciliation of 
the party. A fact that until next general election it did not appear a foreign 
problem with a potential to split it up again was also important. 
Behind this, Chamberlain had to face the opposition from his own 
Unionist ranks in the Parliament. The situation went too far that there was 
even considered a possibility of reunion of Liberal party and a Unionist par-
ty wing that criticized Chamberlain’s proposal. However, it did not take 
place, because of various views on the education question and of the issue 
concerning leadership of the Liberal party. A crucial hurdle was a fact, that 
Unionists accepted the education reform. Moreover, they were prepared to 
36)  MATTHEW, H. C. G., Liberal Imperialists. The Ideas and Policy of a post-Gladstonian Élite, 
Oxford 1973, pp. 100–101. 
37)  JACOBSON, P. D., Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism, 1899–1903, in: The Journal of British 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1. (nov., 1973). p. 104.
38)  MATTHEW, pp. 102–105. 
The topic of expensive food was one of the most important themes 
in the Liberal campaign against the imperial preference. The struggle 
against the “stomach tax”32 was to some extent based on a fi ght for moral 
good and for protection of the poor from undesirable rising of living costs. 
Liberals, quite in a populist way, connected moreover the problem with pos-
sible spreading of the poverty within the mother country. Therefore, they 
were not willing to save the Empire by lowering of living standards in Bri-
tain itself. Sir Campbell-Bannerman himself expressed this attitude in a re-
latively dramatic way: “In this country we know – thanks to the patience and 
accurate scientifi c investigations of Mr. Rowntree and Mr. Charles Booth… that 
there is about 30 % of out population underfed, on the verge of hunger… 30 % 
of 41 millions comes to something over 12 millions – almost identical, as you 
see, with the whole population of the Colonies. So that it comes to this, that for 
every man in the Colonies who is benefi ted, one head is shoved under water in 
this country…. These are terrible fi gures, terrible in condemnation of this wild 
and rash project…” He continued in similar manner and attacked imperial 
preference from a position of practical tradition: “To dispute Free Trade, af-
ter fi fty years´ experience of it, is like disputing the law of gravitation.”33
Not only prices of food concerned the Liberal party. Another fi eld 
was industry as such. It appeared an argument that the adopting of imperial 
preference would mark up production costs, what, in a result, would endan-
ger ability of British companies to compete with foreign concurrence.34
From a point of British trade, they criticized general direction of 
the proposal. Lloyd George put it well in a speech at Cambridge University 
Liberal Club on the 23 May 1903, when he said: “The Colonial trade is only 
one-quarter of the English trade; three quarters is with foreign countries. … Are 
we going to close our doors against customers numbering 250 millions at least, 
simply in order to increase the custom of eleven millions of people? It is folly.”35 
Similar approach adopted Liberal Imperialists organised in the Li-
beral League. Although Lord Rosebery tried to maintain beyond party lines 
fi rstly, he recognized quickly, that he had fi nd himself in a political isolati-
on. Consequently, he wanted to renew his position and tried to transform 
32)  An author of this horrifying expression was journalist Alfred Harmsworth. See GRIGG, p. 61.
33)  An article in The Times published on 6 June 1903. Quoted in WILSON, p. 410.
34)  ZEBEL, p. 140.
35)  In this case, he did not count India amongst inhabitants of the Empire, because, as he 
told: „she is not a great customer and never will be.“ GRIGG, J., op. cit., pp. 62–63.
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by the situation and could not be implemented into the practice.41 Both re-
ports advised reduction in licenses of public houses and breweries, but diff e-
rences appeared in ways of compensations for cancelled licenses. Lord Peel, 
on the one hand, requested very limited fi nancial compensation, what ou-
traged producers and distributors. On the other hand, his opponents de-
manded full fi nancial compensations. It meant that it was to be paid a sum 
identical with a value of closed public house or brewery.42
Problem was that the Unionist government submitted its Licensing 
Bill in 1904, which was based on the second recommendation. Although con-
sumption of the alcohol declining at the beginning of the 20th century, Non-
conformists used an argument that there were spent 200 million pounds on 
alcohol in 1903, what was, from their point of view, an unforgivable support 
of alcoholism.43 In this situation, it was inconceivable for them to approve 
some kind of fi nancial compensation for cancelled licences. The issue brought 
single wings of the Liberal party nearer, above all Nonconformists and the 
main body of the Liberals found new common topic. Moreover, due to the fact 
that among the Liberal Imperialists was a considerable number of Nonconfor-
mists, a process of strengthening newly founded unity continued further. 
The Unionist Cabinet enforced the proposal through both Houses 
and fi nally, the bill became the law at the beginning of 1905. However, this vic-
tory was the last of the Cabinet. It had to deal henceforth with Chamberlain’s pro-
blematic private campaign for imperial preference, which had been dividing 
between both the Conservative and the Liberal Unionist Party since 1903. Mo-
reover, government faced some kind of exhaustion, lack of agenda and burnout 
that resulted from twenty years long dominance on the British political scene. 
On the other side, the Liberal party, that had been in a crisis since 
1886, revived, found its new agenda and its unity and turned profi t from 
every controversy with the government. The last one broke out in the March 
1904 and was closely related to a post-war renewal of the South Africa. Re-
construction of the country did not progress as scheduled and therefore, in 
the autumn 1903, owners of golden mines on the Rand had asked Governor 
of the Transvaal and the Orange State Colony, Alfred Milner, for an endorse-
41)  More about Peel Commission and its conclusions compare FAHEY, D. M., Temperance and 
the Liberal Party – Lord Peel´s Report, 1899, in: The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2. 
(máj 1971), pp. 132–159.
42)  Ibidem, p. 136.
43)  ROWLAND, P., The Last Liberal Governments: The Promised Land, 1905–1910, London 1 968, p. 3.
join the Liberal party only if Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann was replaced. 
They were able to accept only Lord Rosebery or Duke of Devonshire on his 
place. Such terms were inacceptable for the Liberals of course. The education 
issue was fundamental for them and it was impossible to accept demands of 
some few newcomers for the exchange of the party leader as well. In spite of 
the fact, eleven Unionists cross the line individually between the February 
1904 and the beginning of the 1906.39
By-elections within years 1904 and 1905 indicated shift of the pu-
blic opinion in favour of the Liberal party. The scene was not more divided 
by the Irish question only. In the imperial preference, it appeared a new is-
sue that laid down a new political border. An advantage of the Liberal party 
was that the Irish question lost its urgency for some time, what was caused 
by the new policy of constructive Unionism adopted at the turn of the centu-
ries, which tried to “Kill Home Rule with kindness.”40 Another Liberal advan-
tage was that all fractions of the party opposed the imperial preference 
jointly, whereas both the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists were divi-
ded strongly between adherents and opponents of this scheme. Although the 
imperial preference remained the most important topic until the second 
half of the year 1906 and, in some respect, it led to considerable weakening 
of Balfour position in the Cabinet and thus to his resignation, within the 
years 1904–1906 appeared two another issues that helped to cement a new 
founded unity of the Liberal party. 
The fi rst one was a struggle against Licensing Bill of the year 1904. 
Production and distribution of alcohol was not new issue. The Liberal go-
vernment, from the year 1890s, dealt with the question due to eminent inte-
rest of Nonconformists, who considered spirits as a true cause of poverty, 
bad housing and illiteracy. Finally, Lord Salisbury’s Unionist Cabinet ap-
pointed the Royal Commission on Licensing Laws in 1896 under the leader-
ship of Lord Peel. It submitted two reports in 1899, because of disagreements 
between its members. Of course, conclusions of both reports were weakened 
39)  MACKAY, p. 198.
40)  The constructive Unionism destroyed argument of the Irish Nationalists about brutal and 
regardles British rule over Ireland. The movement reached the top at the turn of the 19th 
and 20th century and was characterised by struggle with unemployment, support of Irish 
industry, helpfulness to peasants and endeavour to develop congested areas in Ireland. 
LYONS, F. S. L., Ireland Since the Famine, New York 1971, p. 200–201. 
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opposition. This could be proved in results of the by-elections. The Liberal 
Imperialist wing and Lord Rosebery lost infl uence upon party structures 
and they were not regarded as a threat to the unity any more. Despite the 
fact, some Limps intended to force Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann to re-
sign from party leadership and then to leave for the Lords, what would mean 
an elimination of his infl uence among the Liberals and in a future Cabinet. 
R. B. Haldane, E. Grey and H. H. Asquith agreed in the so-called Relugas Com-
pact of September 1905 that they would join the new Liberal Cabinet only 
under mentioned condition. Simultaneously, they expressed ambitions for 
concrete posts in the new Liberal government. Asquith was to become The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Grey Foreign Secretary and Haldane was to ob-
tain the Woolsack.50 Campbell-Bannermann learned about the pact relative-
ly quickly. He accepted their demand for concrete Cabinet post on the one 
hand, but on the other hand, he refused the main condition of the Relugas 
Compact – his leaving to the Lords.51
On 3 December 1905, Balfour resigned and off ered Liberals an 
opportunity. He thought the Liberal party was divided once again and 
therefore Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann would not be able to form 
a new Liberal government. In a case of such development, the Liberal par-
ty would discredit itself and Unionists would win announced general elec-
tion. The short brake should thus give enough time and place to the Unio-
nists for regeneration and consolidation.52 However, he was mistaken 
awfully. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann destroyed the Relugas Compact 
and forced its members to join the government without his leaving to the 
Lords. On this background, he formed the so-called “Cabinet of all the ta-
lents”. Consequent Liberal victory in the general election that took place at 
the turn of years 1905 and 1906 was thus a result of reintegration process 
lasting from 1902, political mistakes of the Unionist Cabinet. Balfour’s ti-
ming did not have a positive impact on results of the Unionists, because of 
the political experience of Campbell-Bannerman. Moreover, it was que-
stionable if, after 20 years of dominance, the exhausted, divided and bur-
ned out Unionists could off er an adequate alternative to the rejoined and 
consolidated Liberal party.
50) WILSON, p. 427. 
51) JENKINS, R., Asquith, London 1964, pp. 162–164.
52) ROWLAND, pp. 7–8.
ment to rent suffi  cient number of the Indian and the Chinese labourers.44 
The request was set before the Parliament in London and was approved. In 
spite of opposition of some prominent Boers as generals Smuts and Botha, 
there were imported 5 000 Chinese to South Africa at the beginning of 1904. 
Until 1906 the number increased to 50 000.45
Emily Hobhouse brought information about the situation into 
Britain once again. This time she criticized horrible working conditions, 
housing and pitifully low wages.46 The problem was discussed in the Com-
mons on 21 March 1904 and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann attacked 
the government with an address similar to the “methods of barbarism” 
speech. He refused the import of the Chinese and Indian labourers and 
criticized the Cabinet, that it was not able to employ native inhabitants 
there and simultaneously to motivate more Englishmen to move to South 
Africa for work, what would have a signifi cant eff ect on a faster anglicisati-
on of the whole area.47 At the end of his address he declared that the condi-
tions, under which the Chinese worked was “very like slavery” and later he 
said: “Indentured labour” no doubt sounds better but do not let us haggle 
over words: let us see what the thing itself is 4´8 The question of the so-called 
Chinese slavery considerably infl uenced public opinion. An expressiveness 
of the word “slavery” and a charge of it had a strong eff ect within the socie-
ty that had proscribed it as a social system more than 70 years ago. At the 
beginning of the 20th century the public opinion could not accept a fact 
that someone was engaged in a system similar or reminding an unmoral 
and outdated one. The issue was helped the Liberal party because of its 
moral dimension. Beyond it, it contended also a rather absurd speculation 
that the government was prepared to hire the Chinese and Indian labou-
rers for a work in Britain in order to lower production costs, what would 
lead to higher unemployment and bigger poverty.49
In the autumn 1905, the education issue, the imperial preference 
and the Chinese slavery were still discussed within the society. They weake-
ned the position of the Unionist government and strengthening the Liberal 
44) BLAKE, R., The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill, London 1974, p. 172.
45) GRIGG, p. 70. 
46) ROWLAND, p. 3.
47) WILSON, p. 399.
48) Ibidem. 
49) BLAKE, p. 173.
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Handels-und Verkehrsbeziehungen 
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Conclusion
The revival of the Liberal party at the beginning of the 20th century had two 
main aspects. Firstly, it was an exchange of political generations, which las-
ted since the 1880s. This factor appeared as essential, because it was natural-
ly accompanied by a slow shift in politics and by reconsideration of some 
outdated late-Victorian dogmas. According to the process, the Liberal party 
was able to off er electors some new perspectives and views that were to react 
to acute problems of society. They made up a new agenda thus, to which Unio-
nists were not able to answer adequately and from which was growing up 
Liberal enthusiasm for welfare reforms.
The second aspect was represented by political mistakes of the 
Unionists that helped to reunite and consolidate the Liberal party on the 
background of collective resistance to Unionist measures. Unionists off ered 
Liberals, struggling since the 1890s with diff erent views on foreign and colo-
nial policy, an opportunity to reunite and to put aside controversial topics of 
the day that had a dividing eff ect on party structures. Infl uential frictions 
within the Liberal Party, as Liberal Imperialists, were therefore appeased 
quickly. The reason was that it did not appear a foreign issue, which would 
have a potential to split up the party again. It did not appear because main 
political themes concerned controversial domestic issues. These, controver-
sial domestic reforms caused that the process of disintegration within the 
Liberals stopped and started their joint and collective defence of Liberal 
principles both outside and inside the party. Issues as the education reform, 
the imperial preference, licensing reform and Chinese slavery attacked Libe-
ral and Nonconformist creed to such an extent, that they often helped to 
surmount or even erase personal disgust between the Liberals and to create 
strong constructive opposition with a new political agenda. This was the 
background and a keystone of the Liberal landslide victory in general elec-
tion at the beginning of 1906. 
1
Die Jahre 1937–1938 gehören im Rahmen der tschechoslowakisch-deuts-
chen Beziehungen zu den dynamischen (die Münchener Konferenz ausge-
nommen), voller offi  zieller Kontakte ohne Rücksicht auf die unterschiede-
nen politischen und ideologischen Standpunkte beider Staaten, bzw. ihrer 
Regierungsvertreter. In diesem Zeitraum wurde sogar eine Reihe langjährig 
verhandelter Kompromisse, Abkommen und Verträge beschlossen. Zug-
leich zeigen diese Verhandlungen, wie die tschechoslowakischen und 
deutschen Wirtschafts- und Verkehrsbeziehungen geknüpft wurden. Die 
kurze Übersicht über die bedeutendsten Verhandlungen bildeten Inhalt 
dieses Beitrages.
Die Bedeutung Deutschlands vergrößerte sich wirtschaftlich und 
verkehrs-mässig für die Tschechoslowakei, besonders nach dem „Anschluss“ 
Österreichs im März 1938. Betrachten wir jetzt den tschechoslowakisch-
deutschen und tschechoslowakisch-österreichischen Handel in den letzten 
vor der Münchener Konferenz Jahren 1936 und 1937.2
1)  Dieser Beitrag entstand im Rahmen des Projektes GAČR 409/09/H024 Die Rolle des Staates 
in der deutschen Wirtschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts.
2)  The National Archives Kew (NA Kew), Foreign Offi  ce (FO), vol. 371/21579, No C3500/1938, 
Czechoslovak Trade with Germany and Austria.
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